Trade protection and tax evasion: Evidence from Kenya, Mauritius, and Nigeria

cg.authorship.typesCGIAR single centreen
cg.coverage.countryKenyaen
cg.coverage.countryMauritiusen
cg.coverage.countryNigeriaen
cg.coverage.iso3166-alpha2KEen
cg.coverage.iso3166-alpha2MUen
cg.coverage.iso3166-alpha2NGen
cg.coverage.regionSub-Saharan Africaen
cg.coverage.regionEastern Africaen
cg.coverage.regionWestern Africaen
cg.creator.identifierAntoine Bouet: 0000-0002-8020-8877en
cg.creator.identifierDevesh Roy: 0000-0003-4795-7240en
cg.identifier.projectIFPRI - Markets, Trade, and Institutions Divisionen
cg.number833en
cg.placeWashington, DCen
cg.reviewStatusInternal Reviewen
dc.contributor.authorBouët, Antoineen
dc.contributor.authorRoy, Deveshen
dc.date.accessioned2024-11-21T09:57:36Zen
dc.date.available2024-11-21T09:57:36Zen
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10568/161716
dc.titleTrade protection and tax evasion: Evidence from Kenya, Mauritius, and Nigeriaen
dcterms.abstractWe examine the effect of trade protection rates on evasion in three African countries: Kenya, Mauritius, and Nigeria. In capturing the effect of trade protection on tariff evasion, we use a much improved measure of trade protection from MacMAP 2001 and 2004. For two of these countries, the MacMAP data set allows the novelty of using variation in trade protection across product, time, and trading partners, leading to significantly refined estimates of evasion elasticity relative to existing studies on tariff evasion. We find a positive elasticity of evasion with respect to tariffs in all three countries. Further, our results match the rankings of countries in terms of institutional quality. Greater responsiveness of evasion to the level of tariffs is established in Nigeria (comparatively weak institutional quality) vis-à-vis Kenya, and in Kenya vis-à-vis Mauritius (comparatively good institutional quality). This pattern is preserved even when focusing on the same set of trading partners and the same set of imported products for the three countries. This result is robust to controlling for protection on related products (that create incentives/opportunities for evasion) and also for degree of differentiation of the product in question (characteristics that determine the ease of detection of evasion).en
dcterms.accessRightsOpen Accessen
dcterms.bibliographicCitationBouët, Antoine; Roy, Devesh. 2008. Trade protection and tax evasion. IFPRI Discussion Paper 833. https://hdl.handle.net/10568/161716en
dcterms.extent36 p.en
dcterms.isPartOfIFPRI Discussion Paperen
dcterms.issued2008en
dcterms.languageenen
dcterms.publisherInternational Food Policy Research Instituteen
dcterms.replaceshttps://ebrary.ifpri.org/digital/collection/p15738coll2/id/31555en
dcterms.subjecttariffsen
dcterms.subjectenforcementen
dcterms.subjecttrade policiesen
dcterms.subjectgovernanceen
dcterms.typeWorking Paperen

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